Competitive Dual-State
A competitive dual-state is a state in which two elected powers run parallel circuits of authority that do not recognise each other's acts; DURCHD8 uses the term for Poland.
Not to be confused with the dual state of Ernst Fraenkel (1941)1, a model of the Nazi state divided into a normative and a prerogative state.2
DURCHD8 uses the term for Poland, where government and presidency had reached this configuration by May 2026. The flagship calls it fully consolidated.3
How Does a Competitive Dual-State Work?
The two circuits hold different kinds of power, and the study describes the asymmetry as built into the arrangement. The government can act. It pays, procures and represents the state, and where a law is blocked it turns to cabinet resolutions, to prosecutors and to chargés d’affaires, who lead more than fifty of Poland’s missions abroad by the study’s count.4 The president and the leadership of the Constitutional Tribunal can refuse. They veto, withhold oaths and keep the door shut.
Each side denies the other’s acts. An oath before a notary in the Sejm makes a judge in the eyes of the government, the Sejm and the Strasbourg court,5 and a usurper in the eyes of the president, the Tribunal’s leadership and their camp.6
The detours keep the state running, and by keeping it running they remove the pressure that would force a settlement. “What holds it together is what cannot resolve it,” the public note says.7 Even binding orders from European institutions are absorbed at the boundary between the two circuits without effect.
The two circuits of authority in a competitive dual-state. Source: DURCHD8 diagram based on the Poland study.
How Is It Different from Cohabitation and Competitive Authoritarianism?
Cohabitation is a regular constitutional form. In France’s three cohabitations, from 1986 to 1988, 1993 to 1995 and 1997 to 2002,8 the designed channels carried the conflict: the Council of Ministers, the parliamentary majority, the president’s prerogatives. In Poland these channels have stopped delivering, and parallel constructions have taken their place. Poland’s own cohabitation of the early 1990s ran through confidence votes and parliamentary majorities. The study finds no prior Polish parallel for a parliament that swears in judges on its own.9
Competitive authoritarianism, the term of Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way,1011 fits Hungary under Viktor Orbán, by their measure from 2014–2016 onward, the study finds.12 There one actor captured the rights of decision through a new constitution, a redesigned electoral system, the end of media pluralism and a monopoly on judicial appointments. In Poland two democratic mandates block each other, and no single actor holds the decision.
The study also tests the plainest objection, that Poland is living through one more cohabitation. Its claim would fall if an earlier cohabitation showed the same spread of strain across the seven dimensions of the coordination architecture. None does.13
How Does Poland Compare?
Case Years What carried or broke the conflict Parliament swore in judges on its own Hungary under Orbán 2010 to 2024 One actor captured the rights of decision No France, three cohabitations 1986 to 2002 The designed channels carried it No Italy, Mani Pulite from 1992 A judicial inquiry worked around the political branches No Czechia, Babiš and Zeman 2017 to 2021 Government and president aligned, no mutual veto No Poland, early 1990s 1991 to 1993 Confidence votes and parliamentary majorities No Poland, Tusk and Nawrocki since 2025 Two mandates deny each other’s acts, detours keep the state running Yes Where Does Poland Stand Now?
The Poland case page follows each new date and carries the current count of judges sworn in.
How Could the Finding Fail?
The flagship names what would refute it: Poland’s institutions producing accepted results without detours in three fields for six months, or the detours themselves accepted by both camps.14
See Also
Sources
1 Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941; new ed., 2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716204.001.0001.
2 Wikipedia, “Dual State (Model),” accessed November 12, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_state_(model).
3 DURCHD8, “Poland: Two States, One Republic” (2026), https://durchd8.com/poland-s-eu-membership-architecture-under-stress/.
4 DURCHD8, “Poland.”
5 Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland, App. no. 4907/18 (ECtHR, May 7, 2021), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-210065.
6 “Polish Parliament Hosts Swearing-in of Constitutional Court Judges in Defiance of President,” Notes from Poland, April 9, 2026, https://notesfrompoland.com/2026/04/09/polish-parliament-hosts-swearing-in-of-constitutional-court-judges-in-defiance-of-president/.
7 DURCHD8, “Poland.”
8 Assemblée nationale, “Calendrier politique depuis 1958,” accessed November 12, 2026, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/elections/dates.asp.
9 DURCHD8, “Poland.”
10 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002), https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0026.
11 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511781353.
12 DURCHD8, “Poland.”
13 DURCHD8, “Poland.”
14 DURCHD8, “Poland.”
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Last reviewed 12 November 2026
