Hybrid Warfare

Hybrid warfare is a term of the security debate for the coordinated use of military and non-military, covert and overt means; it has no settled definition and ranges from Hoffman's fused battlespace to the wide umbrella of hybrid threats.

Frank Hoffman gave the term its first definition in 2007: conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal modes of war fused in one battlespace.1 Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO, the European Union and national governments have used it, together with the wider term “hybrid threats”, for campaigns that stay below open war.2 Each widening took in more, until almost anything short of plain force could be filed under it. DURCHD8 uses the term as the debate uses it and gives it no definition of its own. It takes apart what the term bundles, domain by domain, and treats the meaning space as a domain in its own right.

  • How Does Hybrid Warfare Work?

    No single act makes a campaign hybrid. The conceptual model of the Joint Research Centre and Hybrid CoE states that “one action alone does not make the activity hybrid”; the effect comes from the combination.3 NATO lists the means: disinformation, cyber attacks, economic pressure, irregular armed groups and regular forces, used to blur the line between war and peace and to sow doubt in the minds of target populations.4 The European Union’s framework of 2016 names the purpose. It speaks of exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target and of generating ambiguity “to hinder decision-making processes”.5

    The German federal report on the protection of the constitution for 2025 adds the scale at which the effect appears. Hybrid threats, it says, work beyond the single act and reach into society as a whole; they “must not be viewed in isolation”.6 Among the instruments it lists are espionage, cyber attacks, sabotage, disinformation and influence on politics and the economy, down to targeted investment in key industries.

  • How Do Definitions of Hybrid Warfare Differ?

    Source Definition Where it draws the line
    Frank G. Hoffman, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007 “Hybrid Wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.”7 Modes of war fused in one battlespace
    NATO, “Countering hybrid threats” “Hybrid threats combine military and non-military as well as covert and overt means”8 The mix of means and the blurred line between war and peace
    European Commission and High Representative, Joint Framework, 2016 Activity “used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare”9 The threshold of declared war
    German Federal Government, 2025 “coordinated, illegitimate actions by state and state-directed actors to assert their own interests to the detriment of another state, which remain outside the framework of a conventional military attack”10 A foreign state as originator
    Joint Research Centre and Hybrid CoE, 2021 “hybrid warfare includes the use of force as its defining element”11 Force, as the line between hybrid threats and hybrid warfare

    Each definition draws its line somewhere else: at the modes of war, at the mix of means, at the threshold of declared war, at the originator, at the use of force. The conceptual model of the Joint Research Centre and Hybrid CoE records “at least three main emphases” of the concepts, military, academic and political, and states that it does “not aim to provide a universal definition of Hybrid Threats”.12

  • Hybrid Threats or Hybrid Warfare?

    The two terms are often used interchangeably, which the conceptual model names as one reason why the concepts “can appear confusing”. It treats hybrid threats as the umbrella and hybrid warfare as one part of the activity beneath it; the umbrella “includes many types of activity: interference, influence, operations, campaigns and warfare/war”.13 Hybrid warfare is its “hard end”, and the use of force “changes the entire nature of the conflict and turns it into war”.14 Hybrid CoE, the European Centre of Excellence in Helsinki, places hybrid threats on a range that runs “from influence operations and interference all the way to hybrid warfare”.15

    German official usage sorts by originator. The federal government files sabotage, espionage, cyber attacks and disinformation as hybrid threats “insofar as they have foreign state originators”, and it says of the situation picture on hybrid threats then being prepared by the domestic intelligence service and the Federal Criminal Police Office that it “covers by no means all facets of hybrid threats”.16 The same act counts as a hybrid threat or not, depending on who stands behind it.

  • Where Are the Limits of the Term?

    The literature that works with the term also records its limits. Mikael Wigell, quoted in the conceptual model, observes that “many scholars and analysts contest the utility of the hybrid label, criticizing it for conveying little that is new, for being imprecise, or outright misleading”, and that coupling it with “warfare” risks “unnecessarily militarizing the language of international politics”. The model itself adds that, as a tool to analyse military capabilities, the usefulness of the hybrid warfare concept “is very limited”.17

    The breadth has a price. One label joins acts that take effect on quite different objects: a severed cable on infrastructure, a forged video on what a public holds true, an investment on who owns a key industry. Some of these activities “may not even be illegal per se”.18 What unites them under the term is the line it draws against open force. Where each act takes effect, that line does not say.

  • How Does DURCHD8 Read the Term?

    DURCHD8 takes apart what the term bundles. For each component of a campaign it asks in which domain the act takes place and in which domain its effect arises. The conceptual model points the same way: it works with thirteen domains, which stand for instruments of national power, and notes that “activity in one domain may be aimed at affecting a completely different domain from the one where the activity was detected”.19

    One domain carries the weight in this reading: the meaning space, in which signals are interpreted and evaluated. Martin Sauer’s proof on narrative power derives that every path to coordination passes through meaning, and that narratives constitute a functionally autonomous domain of durable coordinated power. A domain is functionally autonomous if it “cannot be eliminated, replaced, or reduced to its components” without the coordination architecture losing its capacity to coordinate allocation.20 The proof defines the domain by what it does for coordination. The thirteen domains of the conceptual model are defined by the instruments a state can bring to bear, and the information or societal domain among them is a field of such instruments.

    The proof also marks where force ends and power begins. Even the destruction of a coordination architecture operates as an act of power only through the anticipatory processing it produces in other actors; “absent that processing, it is force, not power.”21 The line the term draws between open force and everything else is therefore not the line at which an act becomes politically effective. A kinetic act reaches coordinated power through the meaning space as well.

  • Where Does DURCHD8 Apply It?

    The study Hybrid Warfare Is Already Working (December 2025) takes the term from the debate it examines. It tests a RUSI commentary by William Dixon and Maksym Beznosiuk, which holds that Russia is losing and concludes that “2026 will be the year of hybrid escalation”.22 The study accepts the existence and severity of Russian hybrid activity and tests whether the causal and temporal order used to interpret it holds, and it reads the commentary against RUSI’s own publications. RUSI’s authors describe the activity as attempts “to fracture political cohesion and erode decision-making capacity”.23 The study measures the effect as decision integrity, the capacity of a political system to generate timely, coherent and executable strategic decisions, approximated through decision latency, veto-player density, policy reversals, coalition coherence and the shift of administrative load toward protection. Its causal ordering “does not claim exclusivity and remains open to empirical refinement”.24

    The Germany study Zeitenende (October 2026) keeps apart what the term joins. Russian information operations against Germany dock onto fractures that already exist and do not create them. A second line, drone overflights, sabotage and attempted attacks, follows another logic: it tests reaction times, responsibilities and the protection of critical nodes, and produces meaning at most as a side effect. The study treats the two lines separately.25 Its section on the meaning space names the gap in the response to it: terrorism became a matter for police and military, disinformation one of public order, digitalisation one of administration, and none of the three treats the space in which meaning arises as a space of power.26

    The study NATO Consensus as Ceremony (May 2026) applies the term to the alliance. It finds hybrid permeability high: “the threshold for hybrid, low-level, plausible-deniability actions is demonstrably insufficient.” NATO is organised post-impact, and the primary responsibility for responding to hybrid and informational attacks lies with the affected state.27

  • Which Terms Sit Close to It?

    Term What it targets Origin How DURCHD8 uses it
    Hybrid warfare A state and its society, through combined means up to the use of force Mattis and Hoffman, 2005; Hoffman, 2007 A term of the debate, taken apart by domain
    Hybrid threats “the political room for manoeuvre by targeted states”28 European Union, NATO, Hybrid CoE; German Federal Government The umbrella, of which hybrid warfare is the hard end; in German official use bound to a foreign state originator
    Cognitive warfare Perception, judgement and decision NATO Allied Command Transformation Attacks on processing capacity
    Narrative warfare The structure that determines the meaning of signals DURCHD8 Shifts the frame within which information is interpreted
    FIMI Public discourse and democratic processes in the EU EU External Action Service and European Commission A classification of who acts and what they target in the information space

See Also

Sources

1 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 14, https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf.

2 Georgios Giannopoulos, Hanna Smith, and Marianthi Theocharidou, eds., The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model, public version, EUR 30585 EN (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021), 9, https://doi.org/10.2760/44985.

3 Giannopoulos, Smith, and Theocharidou, Landscape of Hybrid Threats, 9.

4 NATO, “Countering Hybrid Threats,” section “What Are the Hybrid Threats NATO Faces?,” accessed November 22, 2026, https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/countering-hybrid-threats.

5 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats: A European Union Response,” JOIN(2016) 18 final, April 6, 2016, 2, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018.

6 Bundesministerium des Innern, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2025 (Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern, June 2026), 336 (“Sie dürfen also nicht isoliert betrachtet werden”; translation by DURCHD8), https://verfassungsschutzberichte.de/pdfs/vsbericht-2025.pdf.

7 Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century, 14.

8 NATO, “Countering Hybrid Threats.”

9 European Commission and High Representative, “Joint Framework,” 2.

10 Deutscher Bundestag, “Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Dr. Konstantin von Notz, Dr. Irene Mihalic, Agnieszka Brugger, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN: Fragen zur Notwendigkeit eines umfassenden Lagebilds zu Sabotage, Spionage und Desinformation,” Drucksache 21/995, July 24, 2025, 4 (“koordinierte, illegitime Handlungen staatlicher und staatlich gelenkter Akteure zur Durchsetzung eigener Interessen zum Nachteil eines anderen Staates, die außerhalb des Rahmens eines konventionellen militärischen Angriffs bleiben”; translation by DURCHD8), https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/21/009/2100995.pdf.

11 Giannopoulos, Smith, and Theocharidou, Landscape of Hybrid Threats, 41.

12 Giannopoulos, Smith, and Theocharidou, Landscape of Hybrid Threats, 6–7, 9.

13 Giannopoulos, Smith, and Theocharidou, Landscape of Hybrid Threats, 9–10.

14 Giannopoulos, Smith, and Theocharidou, Landscape of Hybrid Threats, 41.

15 Hybrid CoE, “Hybrid Threats as a Concept,” section “What Are Hybrid Threats?,” accessed November 22, 2026, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats-as-a-phenomenon/.

16 Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 21/995, 4–5; translation by DURCHD8.

17 Giannopoulos, Smith, and Theocharidou, Landscape of Hybrid Threats, 10.

18 Giannopoulos, Smith, and Theocharidou, Landscape of Hybrid Threats, 9.

19 Giannopoulos, Smith, and Theocharidou, Landscape of Hybrid Threats, 5, 12.

20 Martin Sauer, “Narrative Power: How Does Durable Coordinated Power Emerge?” (Zenodo, 2026), concept DOI; current version v4.52, doi:10.5281/zenodo.22086051, August 24, 2026, sections “Bottleneck: First Stage,” “Derived Results” and “Theorems,” https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18745256.

21 Sauer, “Narrative Power,” section “Power.”

22 William Dixon and Maksym Beznosiuk, “Russia Is Losing: Time for Putin’s 2026 Hybrid Escalation,” RUSI Commentary, December 19, 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russia-losing-time-putins-2026-hybrid-escalation.

23 Calvin Bailey, “Are We at War with Russia? How Warden’s Rings Map Russia’s Hybrid Strategy,” RUSI Commentary, December 4, 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/are-we-war-russia-how-wardens-rings-map-russias-hybrid-strategy.

24 DURCHD8, “Hybrid Warfare Is Already Working,” December 22, 2025, sections A, E.4 and G.3, https://durchd8.com/hybrid-warfare-is-already-working/.

25 DURCHD8, “Zeitenende: Macht ohne Bedeutung ist bedeutungslos,” version 6.1.1, October 14, 2026, section C.2.5, https://durchd8.com/zeitenende-volksparteien/.

26 DURCHD8, “Zeitenende,” section C.4.3.

27 DURCHD8, “NATO Consensus as Ceremony: Fragmenting While Functioning,” May 17, 2026, sections C.7 and C.14, https://durchd8.com/nato-consensus-as-ceremony/.

28 Hybrid CoE, “Hybrid Threats as a Concept.”

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Last reviewed 22 November 2026